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There have been three great inventions since the beginning of time: fire, the 
wheel, and central banking, 
-- Will Rogers 
 
 Victorians heard with grave attention that the Bank Rate had been raised. They 
did not know what it meant. But they knew that it was an act of extreme wisdom. 
          -- John Kenneth Galbraith  
 
     My assignment is to survey the main questions swirling around monetary 
policy today. I emphasize three words in this sentence, each for a different 
reason. “Main” is because one person’s side issue is another’s main issue. So I 
had to be both selective and judgmental in compiling my list, else this paper 
would have been even longer than it is. “Policy” indicates that I have restricted 
myself to issues that are truly relevant to real-world policymakers, thus omitting 
many interesting but purely academic issues. “Today” means that I focus on 
current issues, thus passing over some illustrious past issues. All these 
omissions still leave a rather long list; so I will treat some issues quite briefly. 
     I have compiled a list like this once before. In December 1999, at what I 
believe was the first conference ever organized by the brand-new European 
Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, I offered (over dinner, no less!) a list of 15 
questions that would have to be answered by anyone starting a central bank from 
scratch at the time (Blinder, 2000). In this paper, I will declare two of my 15 
Frankfurt issues largely resolved, and note that two others have dropped off the 
radar screen without being resolved. However, I will add five new issues. Thus 
the list of issues has grown longer, not shorter, since 1999. But do not mistake 
that for lack of progress. Both the art and science of monetary policy have 
advanced considerably since then.   2
     Before proceeding further, let me mention some issues that I will not take up, 
for their omission is, in some sense, a measure of that progress. My Frankfurt list 
included the old debate over the choice between interest-rate targets and 
monetary-aggregate targets, which seems to have been resolved everywhere 
except in the ECB’s rhetoric. It also included the issue of whether electronic 
money poses a threat to central banks, which was a hot issue then but seems to 
have faded from view.
1 Earlier discussions of central banking issues devoted a 
great deal of attention to the need for central bank independence.
2 But that 
debate is all but over, and I will simply assume that the central bank is 
independent.
3 Similarly, some earlier authors thought it necessary to defend the 
proposition that low inflation is a central goal of monetary policy, a proposition 
that no longer needs defense.
4 In addition, a huge amount of ink has been spilled 
on the time consistency debate and the so-called inflation bias
5—another debate 
that I consider to be over, although others may disagree. 
     What, then, will I discuss? Part I, the longest part of the paper, takes up five 
critical questions regarding the institutional design of the monetary policy 
authority: 
1.  What is the proper objective function for monetary policy? 
2.  How transparent should the central bank be? 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the papers by Charles Goodhart, Charles Friedman, and Michael Woodford in 
the July 2000 special issue of the journal International Finance. 
2 See, for example, Fischer (1994). 
3 However, there are those who worry about fiscal dominance and/or budgetary independence of 
the central bank. 
4 Again, see Fischer (1994). However, the issue of whether monetary policy should target the 
inflation rate or the price level remains a live one. See Issue 15 below. 
5 The original sources were Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).   3
3.  Should the central bank be an inflation targeter, as that term is commonly 
used nowadays? 
4.  Should monetary policy decisions be made by a single individual or by a 
committee--and, if the latter, what type of committee? 
5.  Should the central bank also regulate and/or supervise banks? 
     After that, I turn in Part II to operating principles for monetary policy, 
discussing six issues: 
     6. Is the observed proclivity of central bankers to avoid policy reversals 
justifiable? 
     7. Does the revealed preference of central bankers for gradualism make 
sense? 
     8. Is “fine tuning” possible after all? And if so, should central bankers attempt 
to fine-tune their economies? 
     9. Should central banks lead or follow the financial markets? 
   10. Should central banks in floating exchange rate regimes intervene in the 
foreign-exchange market? 
   11. Should central banks use derivatives in the conduct of monetary policy? 
      Finally, I briefly discuss five issues pertaining to the transmission mechanism 
for monetary policy in Part III: 
     12. Transmission through the term structure of interest rates 
     13. Transmission through the exchange rate 
     14. How should the central bank deal with asset-market bubbles?   4
     15. How should the central bank deal with the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates? 
     16. Do the world’s giant central banks have global responsibilities? 
 
I. The Design and Structure of the Central Bank 
     The first set of five issues pertains to how central banks should be designed 
and organized—to their “constitutions,” so to speak.  
Issue 1: What is the proper objective function for monetary policy? 
     My jumping-off point for this discussion is the loss function that has become 
ubiquitous in academic writings on monetary policy: 
           (1a)      L  =   (π – π*)
2  +  λ(y – y*)
2    or 
           (1b)      L  =   (π – π*)
2  +  λ(u – u*)
2, 
where L is the period loss, π is the inflation rate and π* its target value, y is real 
output and y* its “natural” or “equilibrium” or “potential” value, and u is the 
unemployment rate and u* is the NAIRU. Two variants are given because some 
authors prefer to represent the central bank’s real economic activity objective by 
the output gap while others prefer the unemployment gap. I will return to this 
choice briefly below; but, for the most part, it is immaterial. 
     Nowadays, the live argument is over the size of λ, with some authors fretting 
that it not be set too large. It thus seems almost quaint to recall that Fischer 
(1994) went to great lengths to argue that (π – π*)
2 should figure prominently in 
the loss functions of central banks—that is, that λ < ∞.  No one needs to make 
that argument today.   5
     Making (1) operational, even in a metaphorical sense, requires that the central 
bank choose three parameters: λ, π*, and either y* or u*. Each raises important 
practical issues. 
     Let us start with π*, where two main issues arise. The first is obvious and has 
been so extensively discussed that I will treat it briefly: What’s the number? A 
consensus of sorts seems to have developed around an inflation target of 2% or 
so for advanced, industrial countries. Berg (2005) surveyed practices at 20 
inflation-targeting central banks, eight of which are from rich countries, and every 
one of the eight uses either 2% or 2.5% as the midpoint of its target range. The 
ECB, of course, targets inflation “below, but close to, 2%,” and the Federal 
Reserve’s all-but-announced target is similar.
6 At 2% inflation, the price level 
doubles every 35 years. Why not set the target lower? The two main arguments 
are (a) that price indexes are biased upward and (b) that π* should be set high 
enough to provide a reasonable cushion against deflation (see Issue 15 below). 
Neither seems controversial nowadays, so I move on to a question that is: What 
measure of inflation should be used? 
     One important choice is whether inflation should be measured by a “headline” 
or “core” concept,
7 that is, should it include or exclude energy prices?
8 I am firmly 
                                                 
6 The Fed’s preferred index of consumer prices is not the CPI, but rather the deflator for core 
personal consumption expenditures in the national income and product accounts, which normally 
runs below the core CPI measure. In its February 2006 monetary policy report, the FOMC 
implicitly set its target for core PCE inflation at 1.75-2%. 
7 This is not the only issue. For example, Mankiw and Reis (2003) argue for using wage 
increases rather than price increases. Strum (2006) argues for a PPI measure rather than a CPI 
measure. Reis (2005) explores the role of asset prices in the price index. Yet another issue is 
whether monetary policy should target inflation (the usual choice) or the price level. This last 
question is dealt with briefly under Issue 15 below.   6
in the “core” camp for three related reasons. First, monetary policy is unlikely to 
have much leverage over energy (or food) prices; so it makes sense to focus the 
central bank’s attention on the inflation it can actually do something about. 
Second, even if the bank’s true concern is headline inflation—which is, after all, 
the inflation that consumers actually experience—it can probably forecast future 
headline inflation better by using current and lagged values of core inflation. 
Ricardo Reis and I (2005) demonstrate this conclusion statistically for the United 
States, and I suspect it holds in many countries. Third, I believe that 
concentrating on core inflation is likely to produce more sensible monetary policy 
in the face of oil shocks (see below). 
     Despite these powerful arguments, virtually all central banks and 
governments have opted for headline over core. The ECB, of course, is the most 
prominent example in this part of the world. But Berg’s (2005) list shows that 18 
of the 20 inflation-targeting central banks use a headline concept of inflation. 
     If the choice is controversial, it must be because of the third reason given 
earlier: the response to supply shocks. So let me briefly defend my position.
9 
Consider, first, the case that is dominant in the data: a supply shock that raises 
the relative price of oil temporarily. In that case, oil prices are a source of inflation 
as they rise, but subsequently become a source of deflation as they fall—which 
happens automatically, with no need for central bank action. Given the long lags 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 In most countries, “core” inflation also excludes food prices. (In Japan, the core consumer price 
index excludes fresh food but includes energy products.) However, food prices have not been an 
issue for more than 30 years, so I concentrate on energy. 
9 I have dealt with this topic in more detail in Blinder and Reis (2005), especially pages 41-45.   7
from monetary policy to inflation, there is essentially nothing the central bank can 
do to remove this bit of inflation volatility. 
     The other empirically relevant case is when oil prices rise to permanently 
higher levels. Then oil prices are an engine of inflation, but one that naturally 
peters out unless “second-round effects” on core inflation are large. The recent 
evidence suggests only minor second-round effects, perhaps due to central 
banks’ greater determination to stop inflation in the 1990s and in this decade as 
compared to the 1970s (Hooker, 2002). Why? The presumed answer is better 
anchoring of inflationary expectations (Bernanke, 2006). In any case, returning to 
the main question, there is little that monetary policy can or should do to limit the 
“first-round effects” of an oil shock. For example, targeting headline inflation 
during a period of rising (falling) oil prices might make monetary policy 
excessively tight (loose). Hence my conclusion: Stick to core inflation. 
       The choice of a full-employment target (y* or u*) also merits some 
discussion. Let me first assume that the target is y*, and then consider whether 
u* might be the better choice. 
     The empirical literature contains at least three distinct ways to estimate y*. 
The oldest is potential GDP, which can be defined as: 
      (2)     y* = AF(L*(1-u*), K), 
 where F(.) is the aggregate production function, A is the Solow residual (in 
levels), L* is the full-employment labor force (so L*(1-u*) is the “natural” level of 
employment), and K is the capital  stock. A second concept--which is closely 
related in principle, but is estimated very differently in practice—is the natural   8
rate of output, defined as the level of production (= aggregate demand) at which 
the price level is neither accelerating nor decelerating. It is often “backed out” of 
an estimated Phillips curve using Okun’s law, thereby making no direct use of 
time series data on either K or L (not to mention A). A third approach is to define 
y* as the “trend,” which is then estimated in some mechanical way (e.g., by a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter). 
     In the context of an objective function like (1), which trades off output volatility 
against inflation volatility, the natural rate of output derived from a Phillips-curve 
framework (the second of the three concepts above) seems to be a sensible 
working definition of y*. Often, the empirical procedure begins with an estimate of 
u* from a statistical Phillips curve. Needless to say, that number cannot be 
known with precision. Most European countries, in fact, never had a widely-
accepted estimate of the NAIRU; and the days when a 6% NAIRU was a 
consensus choice in the United States are long gone. So, at a minimum, 
estimates of u* must be treated as time-varying and having large standard errors 
(Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 2001). 
     Notice that, while academics seem to have a revealed preference for output 
gaps over unemployment gaps, a second empirical step is needed to move from 
the latter to the former—which adds an additional element of statistical 
uncertainty. That element is productivity, which translates labor input into output. 
At times when projecting (or even estimating) productivity is difficult, estimating 
the path of y* becomes extremely hazardous.
10 For this very practical reason, I 
have a mild preference for using an unemployment-gap concept rather than an 
                                                 
10 Orphanides (2003) emphasizes this point.   9
output-gap concept. But I do not want to exaggerate the strength of this 
preference. As Blinder and Yellen (2001) and others have noted, an 
unrecognized acceleration (deceleration) of productivity growth can temporarily 
depress (raise) the NAIRU. 
     The next issue is the choice of the weight λ in (1). A higher value of λ 
connotes more concern with output or unemployment gaps, relative to inflation 
gaps, and vice-versa. It is tempting to identify λ with the coefficients α and β in a 
Taylor rule: 
           (3)     i  =  r* + π + α(π – π*) + β(u* - u), 
where i is the nominal interest rate and r* is the equilibrium real interest. But 
Svensson (1997) has shown that the mapping from λ to α and β is by no means 
straightforward. A higher λ need not even lead to a higher ratio β/α, for example. 
Nonetheless, Blinder and Reis (2005) estimate that Alan Greenspan had a much 
higher β/α than either Paul Volcker or the Bundesbank prior to the advent of the 
euro—a reflection, I believe, of his much higher λ. Furthermore, Rudebusch’s 
(2001) calculations of optimal α and β for a simple linear model of the U.S. 
economy under different choices of λ show substantial sensitivity of the ratio β/α 
to λ, and in the intuitive direction.
11 
     Theoretical discussions of the loss function generally end about here. But 
central bankers should ponder two more issues. The first is the functional form. 
The quadratic, of course, is motivated solely by mathematical convenience and 
gives rise, among other things, to certainty equivalence. Never mind the specific 
                                                 
11 Specifically, when λ=1 (his base case), β/α=.58; if λ=4, β/α rises to .95; and if λ=0.25, β/α falls 
to .41. See Rudebusch (2001, Table 1, p. 206).   10
quadratic shape; that’s a quibble I do not want to raise. The more fundamental 
question is why low unemployment should be penalized as much as high 
unemployment—or, indeed, should be penalized at all (Cukierman, 2004). The 
main reason why central bankers worry about low unemployment is that tight 
markets produce rising inflation. But that should be taken care of by the first term 
in (1). If, speaking hypothetically, monetary policy could push u down further 
without pushing π  up, why shouldn’t it? The late 1990s in the United States is an 
historical case in point. Did America suffer some loss because the unemployment 
rate dropped as low at 3.9%? 
     One obvious answer is the standard micro-inefficiency argument: Deviations 
from the real competitive equilibrium in either direction impose welfare losses. 
But this argument is not terribly compelling if the real world is not perfectly 
competitive. For example, monopolistic competition models suggest that output is 
systematically too low, in which case raising it should yield efficiency gains, not 
losses. Furthermore, some of us believe that low unemployment yields notable 
social benefits that are at least partially non-economic in nature. Another possible 
answer, suggested by Cuckierman (2004), is that the inflation bias discussed by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) returns if low unemployment is not penalized 
symmetrically. This may be the best rationale for doing so. 
     The other oft-forgotten issue in specifying the loss function is that every 
central bank has either statutory or tacit responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability. At certain critical times, this objective takes precedence over everything 
else. So financial stability seems far too important to be left out of the loss   11
function. Researchers commonly model this third objective by adding a term like 
γ(rt – rt-1)
2 to (1), on the theory that interest-rate volatility and financial-market 
instability are highly correlated. Such a crude proxy surely misses many 
important aspects of financial instability, however, especially during a banking or 
financial crisis, when financial stability may dominate the central bank’s other 
concerns. So some other approach seems warranted. One possibility is a quasi-
lexicographic ordering under which the central bank minimizes (1) unless serious 
financial instability arises, in which case it turns its attention to the latter. 
Issue 2: How transparent should the central bank be? 
     Much has been written on why central banks should be transparent, some of it 
by me.
12 In fact, there is by now a sizable scholarly literature on this topic, which I 
will not summarize here.
13 Instead, let me just remind readers that there are two 
main reasons to favor transparency. The one on which economists always focus 
is that greater openness should make monetary policy more effective by 
tightening the gears between central bank actions and market expectations. But 
there is another reason, one which real-world central bankers should never 
forget: democratic accountability. 
     One or both of these arguments appear to have persuaded most of the 
world’s central bankers (and/or their governments), because there is an 
unmistakable trend in the direction of greater openness virtually all over the 
world. In a quotation from the 1980s of which I have long been fond, Karl Brunner 
(1981) wrote that: 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Blinder et al. (2001) and Blinder (2004). 
13 For two recent overviews, see Geraats (2002) and Woodford (2005).   12
 
Central Banking [has been] traditionally surrounded by a peculiar 
mystique... The possession of wisdom, perception and relevant 
knowledge is naturally attributed to the management of Central 
Banks... The relevant knowledge seems automatically obtained 
with the appointment and could only be manifested to holders of the 
appropriate position. The mystique thrives on a pervasive 
impression that Central Banking is an esoteric art. Access to this art 
and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The 
esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent 
impossibility to articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words 
and sentences. 
 
This was a caricature, of course, but it captured the underlying reality of the time. 
The received wisdom in central banking circles then was: Say as little as 
possible, and say it cryptically. But attitudes toward transparency have changed 
dramatically since then, and central banks around the world have opened up. 
     Although it is still more of a laggard than a leader in terms of transparency, 
the Federal Reserve is a case in point. Prior to February 1994, the FOMC did not 
even announce its interest rate decisions as it made them, preferring to let 
money market professionals figure them out by observing the Fed’s open market 
operations. Highly stylized minutes of FOMC meetings were published at the 
time, but only after the following meeting. Contemporaneous statements after 
FOMC meetings, however, were rare (and extremely terse) until May 1999. 
     That is when the Fed made several major changes in its disclosure policies, 
changes that amounted to a quantum leap in the volume of useful information it 
provided. First, the FOMC started announcing its “bias” (later changed to 
“balance of risks”) immediately. Second, it began issuing statements after every 
meeting (whether or not there was a change in interest rates). And third, its   13
statements became longer and more substantive. Here is one simple quantitative 
measure. In the three years 1996-1998 inclusive, the FOMC issued a total of five 
post-meeting statements, with an average of 58 substantive words per 
statement—thus under 100 words per year!
14 And the Fed said nothing at all 
after its first two meetings in 1999 (in February and March). But then it issued a 
statement after each of the remaining six FOMC meetings in 1999, averaging 
135 words per statement—thus raising the annual rate to over 1,000 words. This 
pattern has prevailed (approximately) ever since. 
     The FOMC took another step toward greater transparency early in 2002, 
when it began announcing its vote immediately after each meeting, naming 
names. And finally, starting at the beginning of 2005, the Fed began releasing 
the minutes of each meeting with approximately a three-week delay—thus before 
the next meeting. None of these changes can be said to constitute a great leap 
forward. But together they add up to a huge increase in the amount of 
information released by the formerly-mum Fed—as I once called it, a quiet 
revolution (Blinder, 2004). And in my view and, much more important, in 
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s view (Bernanke, 2004b), there is more to come. 
    People often ask if there are limits to (optimal) transparency.
15 My answer is to 
paraphrase Einstein: Every central bank should be as transparent as possible, 
but not more so.
16 By this I mean that the default option should be disclosure; a 
                                                 
14 I include in this count only words pertaining either to the economic situation or to the policy 
decision, excluding standard boilerplate such as the opening sentence, which simply states what 
the FOMC did (“The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to…”), and the closing 
paragraphs that announce the vote and the discount rate recommendations of the district banks. 
15 See, for example, Mishkin (2004) and Cukierman (2006). 
16 Einstein said: “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”   14
central bank should keep things secrets only when there are good reasons for 
doing so.
17 And good reasons do exist. For example, the central bank must 
preserve the confidentiality of proprietary information given to it by private 
banks—for example, in its role as bank supervisor. (See Issue 5 below.) 
Similarly, the central bank must maintain the confidentiality of certain information 
provided to it by governments, both domestic and foreign. I would also not want 
to open monetary policy meetings to the press, because that would likely destroy 
the deliberative process. Finally, the central bank cannot disclose information it 
doesn’t have. This last “limit” to transparency may sound silly, but I will offer 
some concrete examples below. But apart from such minor exceptions, all of 
which are non-controversial, I see few effective limits to transparency. More 
important, I know of no central banks that have bumped up against the constraint 
of maximal transparency, with the possible exceptions of the Bank of Norway and 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). 
     If central banks are not yet near their transparency constraints, what remains 
to be done? The answer, of course, varies by country. For example, the Federal 
Reserve will, I believe, soon begin announcing its inflation target, π*, for the first 
time—something that many central banks have been doing for years. But I think 
it is a fair generalization to say that, with some notable exceptions, most central 
banks around the world still reveal rather little about their forecasts. This may be 
the next transparency frontier. 
                                                 
17 In contrast, Mishkin (2004, p. 50) suggests that transparency is a good thing only to the extent 
that it “help(s) the central bank do its job.”  But, in private conversation, Mishkin has told me that 
he basically agrees with my position.   15
     Of course, nothing in life is simple. Whenever a central bank forecasts more 
than, say, six months ahead, future monetary policy is among the crucial 
assumptions that must be built into the forecast. So what future monetary policy 
should be assumed? The debate to date seems to revolve around three main 
options: 
1. unchanged monetary policy throughout the forecast period 
 
2. the monetary policy path expected by the markets (and therefore 
embedded in, e.g., futures prices) 
 
3. the central bank’s (conditional) forecast of its own future behavior. 
     The current controversy is focused on option 3, which requires the central 
bank to reveal sensitive information. Until recently, the RBNZ was the only one 
brave enough to do this; but lately it has been joined by the Bank of Norway. In 
neither New Zealand nor Norway did revelation of this sensitive information 
provoke turmoil in the markets.
18 Some would argue that things might be different 
if the Fed or the ECB were to start projecting their own policy decisions, given the 
huge volumes of trading in dollar- and euro-denominated securities. But it is by 
no means obvious how better information on the central bank’s intentions can do 
the markets any harm. My guess is that, after a short period of adjustment, 
releasing conditional forecasts of future monetary policy would reduce, not 
increase, market volatility. But many central bankers may disagree with my 
guess, for they are loath to take this step. 
     There is, however, another intensely practical issue that should not be 
ignored: Most central banks, certainly including the Fed, do not even agree upon 
                                                 
18 For the case of New Zealand, see Archer (2005).   16
long-term (conditional) forecasts of the path of their policy rate. In such cases, 
the failure to announce such a path cannot be viewed as a violation of 
transparency. Rather, it falls under the seemingly-obvious rubric mentioned 
earlier: You cannot reveal information you do not have. The broader question, 
then, is whether central banks should (a) formulate (conditional) monetary policy 
plans running one or two years into the future and then (b) announce those plans 
as part of their forecasts. My own answers are yes and yes. But doing so clearly 
represents a major change in the way most central banks do business. Indeed, 
formulating such plans may be a much bigger change in the current modus 
operandi than announcing them once formulated. So option 3 above will probably 
remain on the “to do” list, and therefore on the list of current issues for central 
bankers, for quite a while. 
     What can be done in the interim? Many academics have been intensely 
critical of option 1—making forecasts based on constant (policy) interest rates.
19 
They point to three main problems: (a) it is logically inconsistent (because, e.g., 
actual market rates are not based on this assumption); (b) it is non-transparent 
(because, e.g., the central bank probably does not believe this assumption); and 
(c) it leads to dynamic instability for the reason first pointed out by Friedman 
(1968): Holding the nominal rate fixed in the face of changes in inflation moves 
the real rate in the wrong direction.
20 
     I am less critical of the constant interest rate assumption than some of my 
colleagues--for two main reasons. First, dynamic instability is unlikely to be 
                                                 
19 For recent comprehensive treatments, see Svensson (2006) and Woodford (2006). 
20 Purely forward-looking models with rational expectations telescope this dynamic instability back 
into the present, leading to the failure of such models to converge to any equilibrium.    17
quantitatively important in forecasts that extend only a year or two into the future. 
Second, showing that constant interest rates lead to unsatisfactory outcomes 
serves a useful purpose by providing the predicate for changing monetary policy. 
Still, the critics’ points are valid. 
     Option 2 above (using market expectations of future central bank policy) 
eliminates the inconsistency problem and reduces the non-transparency 
problem. But the instability problem remains because, in dynamic simulations, 
forecasts taken from current market prices will be exogenous rather than 
endogenous. Using such market-based forecasts also raises the “dog chasing its 
tail” danger that I mentioned in Blinder (1998) and that Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997) modeled theoretically.
21 
     There is, however, a workable approach that can eliminate all three problems 
and yet does not require that MPC members agree now on an entire path of 
future policy decisions. The central bank staff can simply use an empirically-
estimated reaction function to project the MPC’s future behavior mechanically—
without attributing those forecasts to the MPC itself. This approach should be 
roughly consistent with market prices because market participants would 
probably use something similar to forecast the central bank’s behavior. It is also 
totally transparent, as long as the bank reveals the forecasting equation. And 
finally, it does not lead to dynamic instability as long as the inflation coefficient in 
the reaction function exceeds one.
22 I would therefore recommend this option to 
central banks for use right now. 
                                                 
21 Woodford (1994) was an important precursor. 
22 For this reason, the Bank of England staff formerly used a Taylor rule in long-run simulations.    18
Issue 3: Should a central bank adopt formal inflation targeting? 
     Recent years have witnessed a notable trend toward a style of monetary 
policymaking that originated in New Zealand in 1990: inflation targeting. As noted 
earlier, Berg (2005) counted 20 inflation targeters, and other observers would 
add a few more central banks to his list. In addition, the ECB can be considered 
a closet inflation targeter, and both the Fed and the BOJ are actively considering 
whether to join the ranks. 
     While much has been written about inflation targeting, I can be brief given 
what I have already written about transparency (Issue 2) and the central bank’s 
objective function (Issue 1)--because the essence of inflation targeting is 
announcing a numerical value for π* and being transparent about it. 
     Svensson (2005) has argued that transparency should extend to the 
announcement of the numerical value of λ, the relative weight on the output (or 
unemployment) gap. But that is another one of those pieces of information that 
central banks cannot reveal because they do not have it. Most of us, I believe, 
would have trouble pinning down our own individual λ’s.
23 For a monetary policy 
committee, the problem is compounded by having to reach a group decision on 
λ—especially when membership in the committee changes over time.
24 
     This discussion does, however, raise an interesting transparency point. All 
inflation targeting central banks are “flexible” inflation targeters—meaning that 
they have λ>0. Why, then, should their policy be called as “inflation targeting” as 
opposed to, say, “unemployment targeting”? Equation (1) looks pretty symmetric 
                                                 
23 In fairness to Svensson, this would probably be done by examining alternative optimal paths 
generated by the bank staff for different choices of λ. It is not impossible.  
24 Svensson has suggested voting, with the median voter’s preferences prevailing.   19
to me. One possible answer is deliberate obfuscation, which Mishkin (2004) 
argues is iquite prevalent. A second possible answer is that π* is a choice 
variable whereas u* (or y*) is a datum that is given to the central bank (Svensson 
(1999), page 626). To me, that answer is unsatisfactory, however, because 
proper division of labor dictates that the government should select π* (perhaps in 
consultation with the bank) and then hand it to the MPC as a datum.
25 The fact 
that π* is given by law whereas u* is given by “nature” should be irrelevant to the 
central bank, which should simply take both targets as given and set about 
minimizing (1), like a bunch of good Keynesian dentists. 
     Thus, when we translate equations (which only the experts understand) into 
words, objective functions like (1) seem more consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s dual mandate than with, say, the ECB’s hierarchical goal or the 
rhetoric of many inflation targeting banks, as Meyer (2006) points out. Calling the 
minimization of (1) “inflation targeting” therefore seems to be a step away from 
transparency. 
     Transparent or not, central banks (or their governments) still need to decide 
whether to join the ranks of the inflation targeters.
26 Historically, most (but not all) 
nations that have adopted inflation targeting did so under duress. Either their 
monetary policy had failed, leaving inflation too high (e.g., New Zealand), or they 
were forced to change their monetary policy regime owing to, say, the collapse of 
a fixed exchange rate (e.g., the UK, Brazil).  
                                                 
25 One important caveat: π* should not be chosen so frequently that it becomes a political 
variable. I like to think of it as being chosen at the “constitutional” stage. 
26 As my colleague Lars Svensson likes to point out, no central bank that has made this choice 
has subsequently abandoned inflation targeting. That is certainly suggestive.   20
     But the past need not be prologue. Recent converts to inflation targeting, such 
as Norway (and, one might say, the United States), have moved in that direction 
voluntarily—presumably because they were persuaded that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. What are the benefits? The most obvious answer is lower 
inflation, though here the reverse causation problem is severe. (Countries that 
want to reduce inflation are more likely to adopt IT.
27) Successful inflation 
targeting should also make inflation less volatile, as Vega and Winkelried (2005) 
find, and should anchor expectations at or very close to π*. That nominal anchor, 
in turn, can give the central bank greater flexibility to respond to short-run 
exigencies such as high unemployment or oil shocks.  
Issue 4: Should monetary policy be made by an individual or a committee? 
     In yet another “quiet revolution,” more and more central banks have begun 
making monetary policy decisions by committee. Fry et al.’s (2000) survey of 
practices at 88 central banks (about half the total) found that 79 made monetary 
policy decisions by committee while only nine left those decisions to a single 
individual. Thus governments around the world have revealed a clear preference 
for decisionmaking by committee. This phenomenon raises two questions: Why 
have nations switched from individuals to committees? And is this trend 
desirable? 
     The “why” question can be approached in two ways. First, as an empirical or 
historical matter, I believe that the main factor underlying the worldwide trend 
toward monetary policy committees (MPCs) was the perceived success of the 
Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, both of which had long made decisions 
                                                 
27 See Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Willard (2006).   21
(at least putatively) by committee. Imitation is, after all, the sincerest form of 
flattery. In addition, there is no reason to have a monetary policy committee when 
the central bank is simply taking orders from its government. So the trend toward 
central bank independence opened the door to committee decisionmaking. 
     Second, what are some of the conceptual or theoretical reasons why a central 
bank might prefer a committee to an individual? Since I have treated this subject 
at length elsewhere, and because it was recently the topic of an excellent 
symposium at another European central bank,
28 I can again be brief. In Blinder 
(2004, Chapter 2), I summarized the main arguments for preferring committee to 
individual decisionmaking under the following four rubrics: 
1.  Pooling: A committee pools the disparate knowledge of its individual 
members. 
2.  Diversity: Members of a committee bring different decisionmaking 
heuristics to a complex problem. 
3.  Checks and balances: Committees are less likely to adopt extreme or 
idiosyncratic positions. 
4.  Reduced volatility: Owing to “averaging” (which need not be interpreted 
literally), the decisions of a group are likely to be less volatile. 
     Perusing these four virtues, only the last might conceivably be turned around 
and viewed as a vice instead--because one person’s low volatility is another’s 
excessive inertia. But Sibert (2005) has pointed to another possible downside of 
                                                 
28 De Nederlandsche Bank held a workshop entitled “Central Banking by Committee” in 
Amsterdam on November 28, 2005.   22
group decisionmaking: that it might devolve into “groupthink,” which is really a 
polite word for not thinking at all, but merely following the crowd.
29 
      Empirical evidence—much of it from psychology—points modestly toward the 
superiority of group over individual decisionmaking, though the evidence is 
certainly not dispositive and, of course, does not come from studies of monetary 
policy.
30 This last point is one of the considerations that led John Morgan and me 
(2005) to design and carry out a laboratory experiment in which students made 
synthetic monetary policy decisions both as individuals and as part of five-person 
groups.
31 It was not surprising, given the literature, that we found that groups 
outperformed individuals by a modest margin. It was, however, surprising that we 
found that groups were not more inertial—in sharp contrast to 4 above. 
     Morgan and I are currently working on a sequel to our original experiment, 
designed to shed light on two further issues. First, do large groups (for us, n=8) 
outperform small groups (n=4), or vice-versa? This issue is germane to the 
design of monetary policy committees which, in the real world, range in size from 
three to 19 members. Second, do groups with designated leaders outperform 
groups without leaders? This issue is particularly important because all real-world 
MPCs—indeed, I am tempted to say all real committees—have leaders. 
                                                 
29 Sibert (2005) also devotes a great deal of attention to evidence for free riding and/or social 
loafing in committees. But I cannot believe this is important on MPCs, where (unlike faculty 
committees, say) the group decision is the most important task each committee member has. 
30 Kerr et al. (1996) is a metastudy of the experimental literature in psychology; they concluded 
that there is no general answer to the question. See Blinder (2004) for a summary of the 
economic literature, much of it theoretical. Sibert (2005) offers evidence that questions the 
superiority of group decisionmaking. 
31 This work was subsequently replicated by researchers at the Bank of England. See Lombardelli 
et al. (2005). Our choice of five-person groups was made long before we heard Sibert’s (2005) 
claim that five is the optimal group size!   23
     In designing an MPC, size is not the only consideration. Blinder et al. (2001) 
first introduced the following typology, which was further developed in Blinder 
(2004). Committees can either be individualistic, meaning that they make 
decisions by true majority rule with each member voting for his or her own 
preferred policy—as at the Bank of England, for example; or they can be 
collegial, meaning that they agree in advance to submerge individual differences 
in order to reach a group consensus—as at the Fed or the ECB. Collegial 
committees can be further divided into those that are genuinely collegial, 
meaning that the chairman seeks the committee’s consensus and then 
persuades recalcitrant members to go along (e.g., the ECB Governing Council), 
or autocratically collegial, meaning that the chairman more or less dictates the 
“consensus” to the other members (e.g., the FOMC under Alan Greenspan). 
     I argued in Blinder (2004) that autocratically-collegial committees are liable to 
behave too much like individual decisionmakers, thereby leaving most of the 
benefits of group decisionmaking on the table. This logic seems to point toward 
either genuinely collegial or individualistic monetary policy committees. I argued 
in Blinder (2005), incidentally, that the most appropriate communication strategy 
for a central bank hinges sensitively on the type of MPC that it selects, which 
links Issues 2 and 4. But, I have neither the time nor the space to go into that 
linkage here. 
Issue 5: Should central banks also be bank supervisors? 
     One noteworthy recent departure from traditional central banking practice is 
the trend toward taking central banks out of the business of bank supervision and   24
regulation. This new division of labor has occurred in varying degrees (in some 
places completely) in the UK, Germany, and Japan, to name just a few major 
countries.
32 And it is highly controversial, with reasonable arguments on both 
sides.
33 While there are other aspects, the essence of the debate, it seems to 
me, boils down to whether economies of scope or conflicts of interest are the 
dominant effects when monetary policy (sometimes called “macro prudential” 
policy) and bank supervision (“micro prudential” policy) are consolidated in the 
same authority.
34   
     The (tacit) traditional view emphasizes economies of scope, which imply that 
the two functions are best performed by the same institution. Why might that be 
so? Unlike the case with private businesses, the economies-of-scope issue does 
not turn on cost savings; central banks do not save money by using the same 
staff for bank supervision and monetary policy. Rather, the main issue is whether 
there are quantitatively meaningful complementarities between the central bank’s 
macro-prudential and micro-prudential responsibilities. The Federal Reserve’s 
former Vice Chairman, Roger Ferguson (2000, p. 301), believes there are: “I 
think the Fed’s monetary policy is better because of its supervisory 
responsibilities, and its supervision and regulation are better because of its 
stabilization responsibilities.” 
     For example, having supervisory authority over commercial banks gives the 
central bank unique access to timely information on the health and operation of 
                                                 
32 See Freytag and and Masciandaro (2005, p. 2) for a more complete list. 
33 For a comprehensive look at the arguments pro and con, see Goodhart (2000).  
34 Among the other aspects is the question of whether assigning supervisory power to the central 
bank concentrates too much power in one agency.   25
the banking system—information that might be relevant, for example, to making 
judgments about the credit channel of monetary transmission.
35 Such information 
becomes obviously important at certain critical junctures; the global financial 
crisis in the summer and fall of 1998 was one dramatic case in point. More 
generally, there is at least some evidence that supervisory information enhances 
the Fed’s ability to forecast the economy (Peek et al., 1999). 
     Looking for complementarities in the other direction, having responsibility for 
monetary policy might force the bank supervisor to internalize the potential 
macroeconomic consequences of its actions. To cite a prominent U.S. example, 
bank supervisors were heavily criticized in the early 1990s for exacerbating the 
“credit crunch,” which in turn hampered recovery from the 1990-1991 
recession.
36 More generally, it has been suggested that micro-prudential policies 
can exacerbate business cycles by, for example, forcing banks to rebuild capital 
during a cyclical downturn.
37 Recently, bank supervisors have been taking this 
long-neglected issue seriously (White, 2006). 
     But there are also arguments on the other side. The very things I just cited as 
potential economies of scope can be viewed as potential sources of conflict of 
interest instead. For example, should a supervisor allow sick banks to continue to 
operate just because macroeconomic conditions are weak? I have just 
suggested why the answer might be yes. But there is a legitimate worry that a 
                                                 
35 The Federal Reserve has made this argument many times. See, for example, see Meyer 
(1999) or Ferguson (2000). 
36 Among many sources that could be cited, see Bernanke and Lown (1991). 
37 See Kashyap and Stein (2004) and several of the references cited there.   26
central bank’s concern with macroeconomic management might cloud its 
supervisory judgment, thereby imperiling safety and soundness. 
     Another set of issues arises from the increasing complexity of financial 
institutions. A modern universal bank is also an investment bank, a stock 
brokerage, a funds manager, and an insurance company, to name just a few. 
The lines that separate one type of financial activity from another are getting 
blurrier and blurrier all the time, and the activities themselves are growing more 
complex. For a central bank to monitor all these disparate activities, it needs staff 
with expertise in securities and insurance (and other things) as well as in 
banking. It may also find itself bumping heads with the nation’s securities and 
insurance regulators, thereby creating either overlapping jurisdictions or, what is 
worse, gaps in supervision. Bringing some order to this potential jumble makes it 
difficult to apply the otherwise-appealing principle of “functional regulation,” 
whereby the banking supervisor watches over banking activities (even if done at 
Wal-Mart or Merrill Lynch), the securities supervisor polices securities activities 
(even if done at the Bank of America), and so on. A potentially cleaner approach 
is to create one financial “super regulator” that can watch over all financial 
activities at a given institution at once. 
     Where do I come out on this debate? A bit wishy-washy, I’m afraid, and about 
where I was when I compiled my 1999 Frankfurt list. There I wrote (Blinder, 2000, 
p. 69): 
Proprietary information that the central bank receives in bank 
examinations is of some, limited use in formulating monetary policy—and 
is on rare occasions very important. So, on balance, it is probably better to 
have it than not. On the other hand, a bank supervisor may sometimes   27
have to be a protector of banks and sometimes a stern disciplinarian—and 
either stance may conflict with monetary policy. 
 
I am persuaded that nations should leave at least some supervisory responsibility 
with the central bank. It alone has the broad macroeconomic and even 
international perspective that is crucial from time to time. It alone has the ultimate 
responsibility for both macroeconomic and financial stability. And it alone has the 
resources to serve as lender of last resort should the need arise. Given all that, it 
seems unwise to deprive the central bank of supervisory information that might 
be relevant to performing its job. And I do not believe that getting that information 
secondhand is quite as good as getting it firsthand. 
    But that does not imply that the central bank must be the sole or even the 
dominant bank supervisor, especially in countries with hundreds or thousands of 
non-universal banks. Central bank involvement in bank supervision needs to be 
thought of as lying along a continuum, not as a “zero-one” variable. The U.S., 
with four different federal bank regulatory agencies (and 50 more in the states), is 
a clear example.
38 The Fed should be able to access all the information it needs 
for monetary policy purposes by serving as the “umbrella supervisor” of all large 
bank holding companies. And it should be in a good position to monitor systemic 
risk as long as it has a window into every large financial institution. Neither role 
requires the Fed to be the primary supervisor of hundreds of small banks--as it is 
today. In this regard, it is striking that, for example, the Bank of England, which 
has been entirely excluded from the supervisory arena, has not protested that 
this exclusion has damaged its ability to conduct monetary policy. 
                                                 
38 Not that I would recommend this crazy-quilt structure to any other country!   28
     In any case, regardless of my own views, this is surely a live issue that must 
be addressed by central banks and governments all over the world. 
 
II. Operating Principles for Monetary Policy 
     I turn next to a set of six questions related to how central banks should 
conduct monetary policy. 
Issue 6: Should central banks be so averse to policy reversals? 
     As a broad generalization, the practice of monetary policy seems to be 
growing closer and closer to the way macroeconomists conceptualize it. 
Increasingly, central bankers utilize staff analyses, even quite complicated 
analyses, and think about policy options in the way that technical economists do 
(e.g., via expectational effects, output gaps, Phillips curves, and the like). In fact, 
and in contrast to past practice, many central bankers these days even are 
economists. The current heads of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank of 
England, and the Bank of Israel, for example, are all former academic stars. Yet 
economic analysis and central banking practice appear to diverge sharply in at 
least one prominent respect. The matter is what I call reversal aversion—the 
unwillingness of central bankers to reverse direction. 
     Consider the problem of minimizing the expected discounted present value of 
a loss function like (1) subject to a dynamic, stochastic model of the economy. 
Various aspects of the model, including both the shocks and the coefficients, are 
liable to be changing all the time, which means that the optimal path of the policy 
instrument is also changing all the time. Suppose the central bank’s policy rate   29
has been rising for several meetings, in an attempt to restrain aggregate 
demand. Now suppose an external shock reduces aggregate demand sharply. 
There is then a reasonable chance that the central bank’s optimal policy rate 
would decline even though it has recently been rising. 
     Although the basic logic of optimization suggests that such policy reversals 
should not be uncommon, central bankers seem to avoid them like the plague. 
For example, suppose we use the arbitrary but reasonable definition that a policy 
reversal is a change in direction within three months. Then the allegedly activist 
British MPC has had only one policy reversal out of 32 interest rate changes in its 
brief history (which began only in mid 1997).
39 The Swedish Riskbank began 
using the repo rate as its central policy tool in mid 1994, and since then it has 
changed the rate 66 times.
40 Only two of these were policy reversals, one coming 
just after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The history of 
the Greenspan Fed was longer (18½ years) but similar: It shows just three 
reversals out of 98 policy moves, two of which were associated with the 1987 
stock market crash. So reversals are rare. The question is why. And the further 
question is: Are central banks right to avoid them so assiduously? 
     As just noted, simple versions of optimization theory say no. There is nothing 
particularly strange about a sequence of optimal choices that, say, first rises and 
then falls. Remember Keynes’s classic retort to being chided for changing his 
mind: “When I learn new facts, sir, I change my opinion. What do you do?” So, if 
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paragraph were all current through the end of March 2006. 
40 This count is a bit skewed by 25 changes in 1996, mostly of them small.   30
it is rational to avoid reversals, what factors might standard optimization theory 
be missing? 
     One is the dual problem of simultaneous optimization and (re)estimation in a 
world of pervasive uncertainty. Statistical devices such as Kalman filters (which 
are just an example) will give rise, e.g., to forecasts and parameter estimates that 
evolve slowly as new information is received. Policy based on such forecasts and 
estimates would also evolve slowly. 
     Another factor is surely central bankers’ concern with their credibility. If 
citizens, and perhaps even markets, do not understand the underlying model, do 
not observe the shocks very well, or do not understand the logic of optimization 
in the face of “news,” they might misinterpret a sequence in which interest rates 
first rise and then fall as prima facie evidence that the bank had erred.
41 That 
belief, in turn, might undermine the bank’s credibility or, in an extreme case, even 
threaten its independence. At minimum, a quick policy reversal poses a major 
communication problem. Central banks worry about the loss of credibility a great 
deal. To cite just one example, Alan Greenspan told the FOMC in July 1996 that, 
“If we are perceived to have tightened and then have been compelled by market 
forces to quickly reverse, our reputation for professionalism will suffer a severe 
blow.”
42 Hundreds of similar statements must have been made by central 
bankers all over the world. 
     A second factor leading to reversal aversion may be concern with financial 
market stability. Frequent policy reversals by the central bank might induce 
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unwanted volatility in financial markets as traders felt they were being 
whipsawed. And a third factor, of course, is the natural unwillingness to be seen 
as admitting error. So, on balance, the observed aversion to policy reversals is 
understandable—whether or not it is optimal. 
     There is, however, a downside to refusing to reverse course. Remember that 
a central bank that will not change its policy stance even though it is optimal to 
do so will from time to time find itself falling “behind the curve”—and will 
subsequently have to play catch-up. That in itself can cause turbulence in 
financial markets. More important, falling “behind the curve” presumably means 
either that the inflationary cat gets out of the bag or that the economy suffers a 
longer slump than is necessary. 
     Thus reversal aversion is of a different character from the other issues on my 
list. In the main, I have chosen matters that are currently controversial. This one 
apparently is not; virtually all central banks seem to exhibit strong aversion to 
policy reversals. The operational question here is: Should the advisability of 
reversal aversion be a subject of active debate? And my answer is yes. 
Issue 7: Is the preference for gradualism rational? 
     To a greater or lesser degree, central banks around the world also seem to 
exhibit a strong revealed preference for gradualism, that is, for tightening or 
easing in a series of small steps rather than making fewer, larger rate changes. 
Econometrically, this means, for example, that when Taylor rules like (3) are 
estimated on real data they always need to include the lagged dependent 
variable, viz.:   32
(4)     i  =  r*  +  π  +  a(π – π*)  +  b(u* - u)  +  θi-1 + ε . 
This equation is typically derived by appending a partial adjustment mechanism, 
                   (5)     i = θi-1 + (1-θ)i*   , 
to the specification of the desired funds rate, i*, given by (3). Since a typical 
estimate of θ is 0.8 or more in quarterly data (Rudebusch, 2005), the implied 
adjustment is very slow. 
     Table 1 displays the observed distributions of the interest rate changes 
actually promulgated by the three central banks mentioned in the previous 
section: the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Swedish Riksbank. 
The strong preference for small changes is evident at all three banks: The 
fraction of all rates changes that is 25 basis points or less is 79% for the Fed, 
88% for the BoE, and 89% for the Riksbank. To put some perspective on this, 
remember that Willem Buiter, a member of the Bank of England’s original MPC, 
once famously derided a 25 basis point rate change as “chicken feed,” 
presumably because it is unlikely that 25 basis points would ever be enough to 
push “actual” to “desired” anything. 
Table 1 
Frequency Distributions of Policy Rate Changes 
Rate change   Federal Reserve
1  Bank of England
2 Sveriges Riksbank
3
Below 25 bps  17  0  32 
Exactly 25 bps  61  28  27 
26-49 bps  3  0  2 
Exactly 50 bps  17  4  5 
Above 50 bps  1  0  0 
Total 99  32  66 
1.  August 1987 through March 2006 
2.  May 1997 through March 2006 
3.  June 1994 through March 2006 
        33
     What the table does not show is the huge amount of serial correlation in the 
data. The Fed is a nice example. It cut rates 24 times between June 1989 and 
September 1992, and then raised rates seven times between February 1994 and 
February 1995. Later, it raised rates six times between June 1999 and May 2000, 
and subsequently cut rates 13 times between January 2001 and June 2003. 
From June 2004 through June 2006, it raised rates by 25 basis points at 17 
consecutive FOMC meetings. None of these episodes was interrupted by even a 
single move in the opposite direction. If Newton had observed such data, he 
might have concluded that a central bank in motion tends to stay in motion in the 
same direction. Why is that? 
     One reason is option value. In a world of constant change, pervasive 
uncertainty, and a strong aversion to policy reversals, a central bank may assign 
a high value to “keeping its options open”--literally. One way to accomplish that is 
to move interest rates more gradually than suggested by simple optimization 
theory (without learning or adjustment costs)—so that you can always stop 
without having to reverse direction. Notice the crucial role of reversal aversion in 
this argument. Changing policy now, rather than waiting for later, forecloses 
options only if you have reversal aversion—for otherwise, you can quickly undo 
whatever you have just done. (Analogously, a stock option, once exercised, is 
gone.) So central bankers’ intense aversion to policy reversals is probably one 
significant factor contributing to monetary policy gradualism. 
     Whether the gradualism induced by reversal aversion should be decried or 
applauded is, of course, a matter of debate. Standard optimization theory is often   34
interpreted as saying that the policy instrument should follow something close to 
a random walk because the central bank should move its policy rate only in 
response to new information. For example, William Poole (2003, pp. 5-6), a 
current member of the FOMC who was formerly an academic economist, wrote:
43 
In my view of the world, future policy actions are almost entirely contingent 
on the arrival of new information… Given information available at the time 
of a meeting, I believe that the standing assumption should be that the 
policy action at the meeting is expected to position the stance of policy 
appropriately. 
 
But the Greenspan Fed often did not behave this way, and one major reason, I 
believe, was Greenspan’s devotion to keeping his options open. He always 
wanted to maintain the flexibility to stop at any moment without having to reverse 
course (Blinder and Reis, 2005). One way to accomplish that is to move 
cautiously when you move. 
     A second plausible reason for gradualism is serially-correlated shocks and/or 
gradual updating of forecasts and parameter estimates, which would keep the 
central bank moving in the same direction over a series of meetings. Rudebusch 
(2005) points out that econometricians cannot readily distinguish between partial 
adjustment and serially-correlated errors. So, rather than observing what appears 
to be central bank inertia, we might just be observing non-inertial responses to 
serially-correlated shocks and changing information. Indeed, Goodhart (2004) 
suggests that serially-correlated forecast errors explain what appears to be 
gradualism at the British MPC, and Sack (2000) found that serially-correlated 
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shocks help explain the FOMC’s observed (and seemingly inertial) reaction 
function. 
     A third possible explanation of gradualism derives from what I have labeled 
“Brainard conservatism” (Blinder, 1998). In a seminal paper, William Brainard 
(1967) suggested that, unlike additive uncertainty, multiplicative uncertainty 
should induce a policymaker to move his instrument less than he would under 
certainty equivalence. Even in Brainard’s original paper, this was not a tight 
deduction, but rather a result that held for certain (plausible?) parameter 
values—basically that covariances were not too large. Subsequent research has 
verified the fragility of Brainard’s result in a variety of more complex settings. 
There is no Brainard conservatism theorem.
44 Yet I still believe what I wrote in 
Blinder (1998, p.12): “My intuition tells me that this finding is more general—or at 
least more wise—in the real world than the mathematics will support.”
45 Notice 
that if a wise central banker is conservative in the Brainard sense, he will 
normally move the policy rate too little to put it where he thinks it should be. He 
will therefore have to move rates again and again--presumably in the same 
direction. 
     A fourth motive for gradualism is the desire to smooth interest rates. As I 
noted earlier, central bankers often associate interest-rate volatility with financial-
market instability, perhaps because rate changes lead to asset revaluations. 
Hence a concern with financial stability can rationalize adding a term like          
γ(it – it-1)
2  to the central bank’s loss function. If that is done, the lagged interest 
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rate is carried naturally into the monetary policy reaction function, without any 
need to posit the existence of adjustment costs. In fact, Rudebusch (2001) finds 
that positing a substantial value of γ helps explain the Fed’s observed—and quite 
inertial--reaction function.  
     Woodford (2003) has constructed a rather different explanation for gradualism 
based on the importance of pre-commitment. He uses a specific forward-looking 
model based on Calvo (1983) pricing, in which only some prices are free to 
adjust each period. In that setting, he argues that, if the central bank can pre-
commit to a future path of interest rates, then firms that are free to set prices now 
will expect rates to keep moving in the same direction. They will therefore adjust 
their prices by more, thereby compensating for those who cannot adjust their 
prices at all. This is beneficial in Woodford’s model because faster price 
adjustment keeps the economy closer to its full-information equilibrium. While 
Woodford’s paper is frequently cited by academics, I am skeptical that this 
specific mechanism influences real-world central bank thinking very much. 
Nonetheless, the basic idea that expected gradual adjustment of short rates can 
lead to strong reactions of long rates is probably quite general (Bernanke, 
2004a). 
     In short, we have a plethora of explanations for why gradualism might be 
rational. I have mentioned five: option value, serially-correlated shocks, Brainard 
conservatism, the desire to smooth (market) interest rates, and expectational 
effects on long-term rates. Any one of them will do. The question is: Which are 
the operative reasons?   37
Issue 8: Is monetary fine tuning possible? Desirable? 
     Were it not for the success of Alan Greenspan as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, the next issue would not be on my list at all. “Fine tuning” sounds like 
an archaic phrase left over from the 1960s. Ever since the 1970s, it has been 
used more often in a pejorative sense than in a prescriptive one, as when my 
colleague Lars Svensson (2001, p.1) warned that “the complex transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, the varying lags and strength of the effects 
through different channels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty 
combine to prevent the use of monetary policy for fine-tuning.” In other words: Do 
not attempt this at home. 
     But Alan Greenspan did, and he succeeded. It is worth asking how. More 
germane to this paper, it is worth asking whether other central bankers should try 
to fine tune their own economies. But what, precisely, does that mean? Blinder 
and Reis (2005), who focus on this question, suggest two aspects: 
(a) pursuing an activist stabilization policy that strives to keep inflation and 
unemployment close to their targets. With a reaction function like a Taylor 
rule, that would mean utilizing relatively high values of α and β. 
(b) adjusting the central bank’s policy instrument(s) frequently in pursuit of that 
goal. Note that, as just argued, frequent adjustment presumably means 
that the typical interest rate change will be small. 
But fine tuning certainly does not mean: 
     (c) achieving or expecting to achieve perfection.    38
     We have already noted that most central banks practice (b). What about (a)? I 
am tempted to answer with Bobby Kennedy’s famous rhetorical question: Why 
not? Consistent with (c), no basketball player expects to hit 100% of his shots—
and none does. Nonetheless, the objective is always the same: to toss the ball in 
the center of the basket, in line with (a). Archers behave similarly when they aim 
their arrows. Indeed, what else should they do? The real fine-tuning issue, it 
seems to me, is how hard to try. 
     If there is an argument against trying too hard, that is, against reacting 
strongly to output and inflation gaps, it must revolve around the dangers of 
oversteering and, therefore, of accidentally destabilizing the economy. How 
realistic is that danger? Rudebusch’s (2001) analysis of optimal versus actual 
policy in a simple linear model of the U.S. economy points strongly toward the 
opposite conclusion: that the Fed’s α and β are too small. On the other hand, 
some of the simulation findings in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Levin, 
Wieland, and Williams (1999), and Orphanides and Williams (2005) suggest that 
the Greenspan Fed reacted too strongly to unemployment or output gaps (but not 
to inflation gaps). The issue seems open. It also strikes me as an important 
practical issue for central bankers to resolve. 
Issue 9: Central banks and financial markets: Who leads and who follows?  
     In Blinder (1998, pp. 59-62), I argued that central banks should guard their 
independence from financial markets as zealously as they guard their 
independence from politics,
46 an argument I picked up in much greater detail in 
                                                 
46 A version of these lectures was first given in 1995, while I was Vice Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board.   39
Blinder (2004, Chapter 3). But other than the theoretical paper by Bernanke and 
Woodford (1997), I have seen almost no scholarly attention to this matter. To 
frame the issue, consider two stereotypes: 
•  Old-Fashioned Central Bank sees itself as a sometimes-stern 
disciplinarian that lords it over the unruly, and sometimes downright 
foolish, financial markets. It sees itself both as the adult at the party and 
as the boss. It therefore expects the markets to follow its lead, even 
though it knows they will not always oblige. 
•  New-Fangled Central Bank, by contrast, is deeply respectful of markets. It 
sees itself as more of a student of the financial markets than as a teacher, 
and it respects the markets for their power and wisdom. It routinely uses 
asset prices to “read” what the markets expect it to do, and it is loath to 
deviate much from that expectation. 
As a broad generalization, my claim is that Old-Fashioned Central Bank is giving 
way to New-Fangled Central Bank in the real world. In part, such a movement is 
inevitable and appropriate—after all, Old-Fashioned Central Bank is a bit of a 
throwback. But I worry a bit that the shift may be going too far. 
     Why might this be of concern? One reason is the dog-chasing-its-tail problem 
mentioned by Blinder (1998) and modeled formally by Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997). When central banks follow market forecasts, which are in turn based on 
forecasts of the central bank’s own behavior, the result can be either dynamic 
instability or a failure of equilibrium to exist, depending on whether the model is 
backward or forward looking. In the real world, this problem would likely manifest   40
itself in a monetary policy that tends to overshoot in both directions, just as 
speculative markets do. 
     Finally, there is the related matter of time horizons. Economic models 
normally pretend that financial markets are populated by coolly-rational, 
farsighted investors with long (if not infinite) time horizons. But this benign view of 
markets contrasts sharply with what people in the trenches see every day on 
trading floors. As Fischer Black slyly put it, financial markets look much more 
efficient from the banks of the Charles than from the banks of the Hudson. On 
the banks of the Hudson and in other financial centers where prices are actually 
made, you find hordes of young traders who are susceptible to fads, herding, and 
occasional hysteria. These people tend to have incredibly short time horizons, 
extending at most to the end of the current pay period and maybe only to the end 
of the trading day. 
     Notice the great irony here. One of the main reasons why central banks 
should be independent of politics is that politicians have notoriously short time 
horizons, extending at most to the next election. Well, the next election is usually 
much further away than the close of the trading day. Wouldn’t it be a shame if 
central bankers, in an effort to be “modern,” escaped from the control of 
shortsighted politicians only to put themselves under the thumb of even more 
shortsighted traders? 
     To be sure, central banks cannot cut themselves off from the markets--and 
should not try. Markets are not only the main transmission mechanism for 
monetary policy but also invaluable sources of information. They need to be   41
respected, though perhaps more for their power than for their wisdom.
47 One way 
to conceptualize my basic point is to contrast the two different meanings of the 
English verb to listen. Should central bankers listen to the markets? Yes, in the 
sense that we should all listen to news broadcasts; but not in the sense that 
children should listen to their mothers.  
Issue 10: Should central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets? 
     One arena in which the preeminence of market judgments over central bank 
judgments clearly holds sway is the prevailing attitude toward foreign exchange 
intervention. Let me break this issue into two closely-linked questions: 
1.  Do central banks have the power to move exchange rates with sterilized 
intervention?
48 
2.  If so, should they use that power? 
     Question 2, of course, comes straight from the previous issue. If markets 
always get the exchange rate right, there is certainly no reason for central banks 
to intervene. So let’s at least entertain the possibility that markets sometimes get 
exchange rates badly wrong. If you reject this possibility, you can skip straight to 
the next section. But you must also explain the value of the dollar in early 1985—
and perhaps today as well. 
     Current thinking in academic and, even more so, in central banking circles 
runs strongly against foreign exchange intervention—mostly answering “no” to 
both questions. Regarding Question 1, the empirical evidence has long been 
read to say that central banks have little ability to move exchange rates, except 
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intervention.   42
perhaps fleetingly, without changing their monetary policies. But more recent 
academic studies, using better data, suggest a bit more scope for unsterilized 
intervention (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). 
     The negative consensus always struck me as a bit peculiar, anyway. Why are 
central banks unable to move currency rates when shifts in private-sector supply 
and demand move them all the time, and by large amounts? No one thinks that 
private currency traders are powerless to move exchange rates. Why do they 
lose this power if they go to work for the public sector? I believe the answer must 
be quantitative rather than qualitative: Private sector traders regularly buy and 
sell currencies in far greater volume than central banks do. So, to me, the real 
question is more normative than positive: Should a central bank buy or sell the 
(possibly large) amount of foreign currency required to move its exchange rate? 
     A negative answer is certainly tenable. Especially in the case of a major, 
actively-traded currency like the dollar, euro, or yen, the requisite volume of 
transactions might be gigantic—which would put the central bank at risk of large 
capital losses if it is wrong. In such cases, the central bank had better be very 
sure (a) that it is right and (b) that the exchange rate goal is important enough to 
justify taking the risk. (And if the exchange rate goal is that important, maybe it 
should use unsterilized intervention anyway.) Such massive foreign exchange 
interventions may also have to be asymmetric. While a central bank can always 
supply as much domestic currency as needed to hold its exchange rate down,
49 it 
may not have enough foreign exchange reserves to prop its exchange rate up. 
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     For the most part, I accept this consensus: Outguessing markets is a 
hazardous business. But, in my view, we must allow for some exceptions.
50 For 
example, there are times when currency misalignments are glaringly obvious, 
even if the “right” exchange rate is not. The dollar in early 1985 (far too high), the 
dollar again in the spring of 1995 (too low), and the euro in the spring of 2001 
(too low) are cases that quickly spring to mind. While neither the timing nor the 
amount of the market’s eventual correction could have been known in advance, it 
was not hard to recognize that exchange rates were misaligned; and the eventual 
direction of change was obvious. In cases like that, chances are good that many 
market participants are aware of the same facts as the central banks, and so are 
holding their positions nervously. That should make it possible for a large (and 
hopefully concerted) intervention by central banks to push the forex market in the 
direction in which it was destined to go anyway. 
     But Question 2 remains. Is the exchange rate a sufficiently important relative 
price that the central bank should (a) temporarily take its eye off its true targets 
(inflation and unemployment) and (b) accept the risk inherent in large-scale 
currency speculation? My own answer is: normally no, but sometimes yes. For 
example, there are rare times when exchange rates are so misaligned that they 
distort trade patterns so much, or interfere so much with demand management, 
that it becomes rational for the central bank to intervene in large volume. Another 
possibility, which is exemplified by China today and perhaps by Japan in 2003-
2004, is that a nation might believe that its vital interests are best served by a 
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to try to “burst” an asset-market bubble. Here I am, in essence, claiming that these conditions are 
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lower exchange rate than the free market would deliver—and be willing to pay 
the price to achieve it. 
     I realize that I am delivering this paper in a euro-zone country with no 
exchange rate to worry about. But the ECB may have to deal with the exchange 
rate issue once again when the markets not only correct the current 
overvaluation of the dollar but probably overshoot. And, of course, the belief that 
recent months have constituted one of those rare moments when concerted 
intervention makes sense is what underlies recent suggestions for a “new Plaza 
accord” (Cline, 2005). So I would like to resurrect the intervention issue, which 
has been dead and buried for too long, and commend it to the attention of central 
bankers. 
Issue 11: Should monetary policy use the derivatives markets? 
     I noted earlier that financial markets are big, powerful, and innovative. Nothing 
illustrates these traits more dramatically than the explosive growth of the markets 
for derivatives. Derivatives pose many interesting and difficult issues for 
supervisors and regulators but, in keeping with my assignment, I confine myself 
to their potential role in monetary policymaking,
51 which comes in three parts: 
1.  as a source of market information 
2.  as part of the monetary transmission mechanism 
3.  as possible assets for open-market operation. 
     The first two are uncontroversial. Given the liquidity and volume of trading in, 
say, interest rate swaps, central banks would be foolish to ignore the signals 
emanating from those markets—and they don’t. Similarly, the most dramatic 
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early influences of a central bank’s policy moves, or even of expectations of 
policy moves, may well be registered in the markets for derivatives such as 
interest rate futures. Since these markets, in turn, are linked to the interest rates 
that matter for real economic decisions, such as those on home mortgages and 
business loans, they are a key component of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. I don’t think anyone doubts either of these propositions. 
     But the third potential role for derivatives is highly speculative at this point; I 
do not know of a single central bank that conducts open-market operations in 
derivatives.
52 I raise the possibility as an issue for the future. Why? 
     One reason is the sheer size and growing importance of some of these 
markets, which means they are terrifically deep and liquid. It has often been said 
that the Federal Reserve conducts open market operations in the U.S. Treasury 
bill market because that is the deepest, most liquid market in the world; and 
similar statements are made about other central banks. Well, that may no longer 
be true. And even if it is true today, it may not be true tomorrow, given the rapid 
expansion of the derivatives markets. Central banks of the future may discover 
that they can get faster, more reliable execution in the swaps market, for 
example. 
     Another reason stems from the juxtaposition of rapid growth of the derivatives 
markets against slow growth of central bank balance sheets. Some observers 
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seems to have been motivated by a desire to conceal its true reserve position, not as a way to 
conduct monetary policy. The Bank of Mexico deals in options on the peso to influence (not peg) 
its exchange rate—though transparently. Finally, as part of its efforts to guard against financial 
disruption at the end of the millennium, the Federal Reserve sold call options on repos in 
October-December 1999. (See Drossos and Hilton (2000).) I am grateful to Steve Cecchetti for 
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feel that the markets are already so large and innovative that central banks have 
a hard time moving even short-term interest rates via conventional open-market 
operations.
53 One obvious answer, of course, is to conduct ever-larger open-
market operations--which is where the size of central bank balance sheets 
comes in. If, for example, currency shrinks relative to GDP while fixed-income 
markets grow, central banks may find their portfolios of T-bills shrinking relative 
to the size of the open-market operations needed to move markets.
54 If and when 
this happens, leverage may be the answer; and that, of course, is where 
derivatives come in. Market participants routinely use derivatives to create huge 
amounts of leverage, and thus effectively to control large volumes of securities 
with relatively little capital. Why can’t central banks, who are certainly higher-
rated counterparties, do the same? It’s something to think about. 
     Of course, central banks will want to move into this domain cautiously, if at all. 
They are stodgy to begin with, appropriately so in my view; and derivatives have 
a vaguely disreputable public image. But most of the “accidents” in the 
derivatives markets, not to mention the frauds, have taken place in “exotics,” not 
in plain-vanilla interest rate swaps, which are simple, transparent, and either are 
or can be traded on organized exchanges. And it is, of course, in plain vanillas 
that any sensible central bank would operate. For this reason, I believe that 
conducting open-market operations in swaps would confer a side benefit by 
steering markets away from exotics toward more plain vanilla swaps. Indeed, 
were I of a mind to predict the future of central banking, as opposed to just 
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analyzing the present, I’d be tempted to forecast appearances by central banks 
in the swaps markets. But for now, it is just something to think about. 
 
III. The Transmission Mechanism for Monetary Policy 
     I turn, finally and more briefly, to five controversial and/or poorly understood 
aspects of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. 
Issue 12: Transmission via the term structure of interest rates 
     The simplest version of the monetary transmission mechanism traces the 
central bank’s influence from overnight rates (which it controls) to longer-term 
interest rates and thereby on to aggregate demand. The link from short rates to 
long rates is normally based on the expectations theory of the term structure of 
interest rates, which states that intermediate- and long-term rates are the 
appropriate weighted averages of expected future short rates. 
     There is a catch, however. It has been known for years that the expectations 
theory fails virtually every empirical test miserably, at least when expectations 
are rational.
55 A one–sentence synopsis of this literature is that long rates are 
terrible (and biased) predictors of future short rates. To show just one example, I 
reproduce below a graph from Blinder (2004, p. 78). It shows, on the horizontal 
axis, the one-year U.S. Treasury bond rate expected to hold nine years ahead 
according to the yield curve and, on the vertical axis, the actual one-year rate 
nine years later. There is hardly any correlation between the two.
56 
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56 The straight line drawn in the graph is not the best-fitting regression line. It is a line with a 
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          Just why this is so remains a major intellectual puzzle. To blame the 
puzzle on time-varying term premia is just to give it a name—like blaming 
machine malfunctions on “gremlins.” In Blinder (2004, Chapter 3), I suggested 
(but certainly did not prove) that the expectations theory fails because long rates 
are far more sensitive to short rates than “rational” pricing models predict. This 
hypothesis may or may not be correct. My main purpose in calling attention to the 
term structure puzzle here is not to resolve it, but rather to urge central bank 
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research departments to give it high priority. It may be the piece of the monetary 
transmission mechanism about which we are most in the dark. 
     This issue relates, by the way, to Issue 9. If markets are so bad at forecasting 
future short-term interest rates, why should we give so much deference to their 
forecasts of anything else—including future central bank policy? 
Issue 13: Transmission via exchange rates: uncovered interest-rate parity 
 
     The mention of unresolved puzzles and terrible forecasts leads naturally to 
the next issue: the equally-embarrassing failure of uncovered interest-rate parity. 
If one-year interest rates are 5% in the United States and 3% in Germany, the 
market is implicitly forecasting a 2% depreciation of the dollar against the euro 
over the coming year. And a similar forecast is implied by every other pair of 
international interest rates over any horizon. Thought of in terms of monetary 
policy, when divergent central bank policies engineer international interest rate 
differentials, those differentials are supposed to first forecast and then become 
exchange rate movements. Unfortunately, on average they do not. Not only are 
uncovered interest-rate parity relationships terrible forecasters of future 
exchange rate movements, they often get the sign wrong.
57 
     This is a serious matter. In the usual story of the role of exchange rates in 
monetary transmission, a country that raises its interest rates experiences a 
currency appreciation. The theory of uncovered interest parity explains that this 
happens in order to induce (rational) expectations that the currency will 
subsequently depreciate back to its original (real) exchange rate. Thus a 
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tightening of monetary policy is supposed to lead to a quick appreciation followed 
by a depreciation. Nice and logical. But, empirically, it does not happen. How, 
then, does monetary policy influence exchange rates? A good question. And until 
it gets a good answer, central bankers are operating in a dense fog. So this issue 
also ranks high on the research agenda—and high on the list of reasons not to 
place excessive trust in market forecasts. 
Issue 14: How should central banks react to asset-price bubbles? 
     Asset prices are an important part of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Other things equal, when stock or home prices rise, a central bank 
that is targeting, say, a weighted average of the inflation and output gaps will 
raise interest rates because wealth effects might otherwise drive aggregate 
demand up too fast. This is old hat, uncontroversial, and a standard part of 
monetary policy practice. 
     But should central banks react to asset-market bubbles per se, meaning over 
and above the amount implied by the link from asset prices to wealth to 
aggregate demand? In the loss function context, that would mean adding some 
asset prices (e.g., stock prices) as a third argument of the loss function. In the 
Taylor rule context, it would mean adding those prices as another term in the 
equation, as Cecchetti et al. (2000) explicitly recommend, so that the central 
bank would then raise interest rates as stock prices go up even if y and π were 
both on target.
58 Both the current and previous chairmen of the Federal Reserve 
are on record as opposing this idea (Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Greenspan 
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(2002)), as am I (Blinder and Reis, 2005, pages 64-70). Since so much ink has 
been spilled on this issue, I can be very terse in outlining the pros and cons. 
     Proponents of bubble bursting argue that: 
•  the central bank has a clear responsibility to preserve financial stability, 
which is threatened by asset bubbles. 
•  sizable bubbles can, in fact, be detected by applying U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart’s famous test for pornography: “You know it when 
you see it.” Furthermore, they can be recognized early enough to do 
something about them. 
•  bubbles lead to misallocations of resources (e.g., the Internet craze) and 
also damage conventional macroeconomic stability (e.g., when a slump 
follows a stock market crash). 
•  the central bank has instruments at its disposal that can deflate bubbles 
without doing undue harm to its primary goals, inflation and 
unemployment. 
This last argument is usually tacit, not explicit, but it is essential. Without it, 
bubble-bursting may do more harm than good, even if all the rest is right. 
     Opponents of bubble-bursting concede that bubbles do happen, do cause 
resource misallocations, and are sometimes recognizable. But they argue that: 
•  financial stability can be maintained by what Reis and I (2005) called the 
“mop up after” strategy.   52
•  bubbles generally become “obvious” only after they have inflated quite far, 
and attempts to identify them earlier would likely produce many false 
positives. 
•  the central bank is not responsible bad private investment decisions, and 
the macroeconomy is best managed by focusing monetary policy on 
inflation and unemployment. 
•  the central bank has no instruments suitable for targeting specifically at 
bubbles. Raising interest rates enough to burst a bubble would likely burst 
the economy as well. 
     I find the second set of arguments far more compelling and, in support, I offer 
the following quick reflections on the greatest bubble in history: the U.S. stock 
market bubble of 1998-2000.
59 The idea is that, if the case for bursting bubbles 
didn’t apply then, it may never apply. 
      First, the stock market bubble was recognizable, but only rather late in the 
game; and acting too early could have been disastrous. For example, even 
during its worst months after the crash, the market never returned to where it was 
on the day in December 1996 that Alan Greenspan declared it to be “irrationally 
exuberant.” Should the Fed have tightened in 1996 and squelched the ensuing 
boom? My answer is no. Second, the “mop up after” strategy worked 
extraordinarily well even in this extreme stress test; not a single sizable bank or 
brokerage firm went bankrupt. Third, despite the fact that a staggering $8 trillion 
in wealth was vaporized, the post-bubble recession was so small that it 
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disappears in annual data. Finally, if the specific concern was tech stocks, what 
instrument could (or should) the Fed have used to target this idiosyncratic 
sector? 
     While my personal opinion is clear, the main point is that real-world central 
bankers need to make a decision on this issue. 
Issue 15: Dealing with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates 
     While central banks control the (very) short-term nominal interest rate, most 
economists believe that it is real interest rates that influence economic activity.
60 
In a deep slump, the central bank would like to make real short rates negative. 
But this is impossible if the inflation rate is zero or negative, because nominal 
interest rates cannot fall below zero. For decades, most economists viewed this 
issue as a theoretical curiosum of no practical importance. But Japan has taught 
us otherwise.
61 
     What to do? First, prevention is clearly better than cure. Bernanke, Reinhart 
and Sack (2004) creatively examined various unconventional monetary policies--
things that a central bank confronted by the zero lower bound might try--and I 
would add exchange-rate intervention to their list. I think it is fair to say that such 
a central bank would not be powerless. That’s the good news. However, the 
unconventional policies are likely to be far weaker than conventional interest-rate 
policy. That’s the bad news. So it is certainly better not to flirt with zero. 
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real mortgage payments in a conventional (nominal) fixed rate mortgage makes the nominal rate 
matter quite a lot to capital-constrained home buyers. 
61 When the core CPI inflation rate in the United States dipped to 1.3% in August 2001, the Fed 
voiced concerns about deflation and the zero lower bound. See Bernanke (2003). At the time of 
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     Inflation targeting, or rather successful inflation targeting, should help. By 
posting a target, π*, that is safely above zero, and then achieving it, a central 
bank can avoid confronting the zero lower bound. At worst, it can always push 
the short-term real interest rate down to -π*, which is why π* should be bounded 
away from zero. Of course, with shocks and control errors, even an inflation 
targeting central bank might find itself below π*, or even below zero. However, 
should this happen, a credible commitment to the positive inflation target should 
keep the current expected inflation rate above the current actual inflation rate, 
leaving r
e = i – π
e well below r = i – π. 
     Targeting the price level, rather than the inflation rate, provides even greater 
protection against getting trapped by the zero lower bound. Credible inflation 
targeting should engender expectations that π, which could go negative for a 
time, will converge upward to π*. But credible price level targeting should 
engender expectations that π will actually overshoot π* for a while in order to get 
the price level, pt, back to its target path--thereby pushing π
e higher sooner. For 
this reason, the earlier verdict that inflation targeting is superior to price level 
targeting (Fischer, 1994) may need to be revisited for a world of very low 
inflation. Note, by the way, that adopting a price level target does not imply that 
the average inflation rate must be zero. The desired price level path can be 
defined to rise over time at some pre-determined inflation rate: pt* = p0(1+π*)
t. 
Issue 16: Do the giant central banks have global responsibilities? 
     There is one last question that most central banks can answer quickly (and in 
the negative) but that giants like the Federal Reserve and the ECB (and perhaps   55
the Bank of Japan and, one day, the People’s Bank of China) must wrestle with: 
Should a central bank consider the welfare of other countries in making its 
domestic monetary policy decisions? Or, put slightly differently, do the Fed and 
ECB bear some responsibility for the health of the world economy? 
     Before addressing this question, let me make an important conceptual 
distinction analogous to the one made under Issue 14 (bubbles). In an 
interrelated world, what happens in Country B will reverberate somewhat on 
Country A. For that reason, the central bank of Country A must and will take 
events in Country B into account in formulating its own domestic monetary policy. 
To cite just one obvious example, forecasts of foreign economies are needed to 
generate a forecast of your own net exports. The question for this section is a 
different one: Should the central bank’s objective function have some foreign (or 
world) variables in it? Or, put more concretely, might there be times when the 
Fed or the ECB should tighten or ease even though their own domestic 
economies are not calling for such action? 
     The case of the “25 basis points that saved the world”—the Fed’s rate cut in 
September 1998, at a time when the U.S. economy was booming—brought this 
issue into bold relief. While Alan Greenspan was careful to justify the cut by 
fretting about possible infection from abroad, many observers at the time thought 
the Fed was doing its part to “save the world.” 
     The question is a vexing one, and one major reason is legal. The Fed was 
created and derives its mandate from acts of the U.S. Congress; the ECB derives 
its authority and mandate from the Maastricht Treaty. In both of these cases, and   56
in all others of which I know, the central bank’s legal mandate pertains 
exclusively to the domestic economy. Other than worrying about possible 
reverberations from various Country B’s, what right, then, does either the Fed or 
the ECB have to take actions designed to help other countries? And if such 
actions run counter to domestic needs, has the central bank actually violated the 
law? These are serious issues. 
     But, on the other hand, an elephant walking through the jungle must take care 
where it steps. The European and American (and perhaps also the Japanese) 
economies are so large, and so important to both real and financial activity 
throughout the world, that it can be argued that good international citizenship 
gives them special responsibilities. That is why I raise the question, but do not 
answer it.  
 
IV. Monetary Policy in the 21
st Century 
     With 16 different issues, it would be foolish to try to summarize all the 
arguments. Instead, let me use this concluding section to provoke discussion by 
offering overly-crisp and excessively definitive answers to the 16 questions 
posed in this paper—leaving out the nuances and counter-arguments. 
     Organizational structure 
     1. Monetary policy should target a core, not headline, measure of inflation and 
set the inflation target well above zero—say, at 2%. 
     2. Most central banks need to become more transparent in several 
dimensions. One is their forecasts, including conditional forecasts of their own   57
behavior. However, a mechanical reaction function might do as an interim 
solution. 
     3. Inflation targeters should be more transparent about having an output or 
unemployment stabilization objective. 
     4. Monetary policy is best made by committees, but autocratically-collegial 
committees may not exploit the advantages of group decisionmaking sufficiently. 
     5. Nations should not exclude their central banks from bank supervision. 
     Operating principles 
     6. Central banks need to question their reasons for such extreme aversion to 
policy reversals. 
     7. On the other hand, we have, if anything, too many good explanations for 
the preference for gradualism. 
     8. Instead of scoffing at “fine tuning,” perhaps some central banks should 
raise their aspiration levels. 
     9. Central banks should lead the markets rather than follow them. 
   10. There may be more scope for unsterilized foreign exchange intervention 
than current central bank rhetoric and practice admit. 
   11. Some central banks should begin thinking about conducting at least some 
of their open-market operations in derivatives. 
     Monetary transmission 
   12. Figuring out why the expectations theory of the term structure fails so badly 
is an urgent research priority for central banks. 
   13. So is the abject failure of uncovered interest parity.   58
   14. Central banks should not use monetary policy to burst asset market 
bubbles. 
   15. Central banks should have contingency plans for dealing with the zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
   16. As the world continues to integrate economically, the ECB and the Fed 
(and eventually also the PBoC) may implicitly have to assume more global 
responsibilities. 
 
     Finally, I confidently predict that, five or ten years from now, some other 
scholar will have no trouble at all in formulating a list of 16 or more unresolved 
monetary policy issues. I just hope some of them are different from mine.   59
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